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INTRODUCTION 
The Duke Law Journal’s Forty-Sixth Annual Administrative 
Law Symposium addresses the timely and important topic of patent 
exceptionalism.1 As I have explored elsewhere, administrative law 
exceptionalism—the misperception that a particular regulatory field 
is so different from the rest of the regulatory state that general 
administrative law principles do not apply—is by no means unique to 
patent law.2 Scholars, attorneys, and agency officials in various 
regulatory fields ranging from immigration to tax have sought, 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s general guidance, “to carve out an 
approach to administrative review good for [the regulatory field’s] 
law only.”3 It appears that similarly exceptionalist views pervade 
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University. Thanks are due to the Duke Law Journal editors and the Symposium organizer, 
Melissa Wasserman, for inviting me to participate in this terrific Symposium and to the 
Symposium participants and my colleague, Guy Rub, for helpful comments. 
 1. For an overview of the Symposium, see James Donald Smith, Foreword: Patent 
Exceptionalism with Presidential Advice and Consent, 65 DUKE L.J. 1551 (2016). 
 2. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer?, 
2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 42–43; Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax 
Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 222 (2014); Christopher J. Walker, The Costs of 
Immigration Exceptionalism, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/the-costs-of-immigration-exceptionalism-by-chris-walker 
[https://perma.cc/82QT-4VTV]. 
 3. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011); see 
id. at 56 (finding “no reason why . . . review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency 
expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as . . . review of other regulations”). To be 
sure, this does not mean that administrative law is uniform across all regulatory contexts. 
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patent law, although the patent law scholars assembled for this 
Symposium do not seem to share those exceptionalist views.4 
This Essay focuses on one of the main debates from the 
Symposium: whether courts should apply Chevron deference to 
interpretations of substantive patent law advanced by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO). Part I frames the debate about 
whether Chevron deference should apply, contrasting the positions 
taken by Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai on the one hand,5 and John 
Golden on the other.6 After agreeing with Professors Benjamin and 
Rai that certain PTO interpretations of substantive patent law are 
probably eligible for Chevron deference, Part II outlines how a 
stronger case could be made for why it is worth the PTO’s time and 
energy to seek Chevron deference from the Supreme Court. Among 
other reasons, the PTO and its U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
lawyers should request such deference to weaken the Federal 
Circuit’s control over substantive patent law and reverse an era of 
patent stare decisis. The Essay concludes by urging patent law 
 
Instead, the Administrative Procedure Act and the Supreme Court’s administrative law 
doctrines set the default standards for agency action and for judicial review of agency action. As 
the Court has explained (in the patent law context, no less), congressional departures from these 
defaults “must be clear.” Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1999); see also 2 RICHARD 
J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2 at 772 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining that 
Dickinson “seemed to establish a presumption in favor of uniformity in standards for judicial 
review of agency actions that can be overcome only by ‘clear’ evidence in support of a 
departure”). 
 4. These nonexceptionalist views are on full display in the scholars’ written contributions 
to the Symposium. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era 
of Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2016); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, 
Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 1601 (2016); John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: 
The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657 (2016); Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 
DUKE L.J. 1701 (2016). But see Orin Kerr, Should the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Get 
Chevron Deference?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 19, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/19/should-the-u-s-patent-
and-trademark-office-get-chevron-deference [https://perma.cc/6Y9F-JJN6] (responding to 
comments by Jonathan Masur, one of the Symposium participants); Orin Kerr, The Case for 
Patent Law and Criminal Law Exceptionalism in the Administrative State, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/02/12/the-case-for-patent-law-and-criminal-law-exceptionalism-in-the-
administrative-state [https://perma.cc/MV5N-R2ZC] (“[P]atent law and criminal law do not rely 
on delegations of lawmaking authority. As a result, I think it would be a bad idea to apply 
deferential standards in patent law or criminal law.”). 
 5. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1597. This Symposium contribution builds on their 
prior work in the area. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the 
APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2007). 
 6. Golden, supra note 4, at 1658. 
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scholars to play a more active role in urging courts to abandon patent 
exceptionalism. 
I.  CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW 
Featured at this Symposium is a growing scholarly debate about 
whether agency statutory interpretations embraced by the PTO’s 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) are eligible for Chevron 
deference. Put differently, the question is whether courts must defer 
to the PTAB’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous provisions of 
the Patent Act.7 This is a new debate in light of new legislation. 
Congress created the PTAB in 2011 as part of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (AIA),8 which was “the most significant 
overhaul to our patent system, since the founding fathers first 
conceived of codifying a grand bargain between society and 
invention.”9 Professors Benjamin and Rai argue that certain PTAB 
interpretations of substantive patent law would be entitled to 
Chevron deference if the agency sought such deference.10 John 
Golden, by contrast, contends that the PTO still does not have 
Chevron-level interpretive authority regarding substantive patent 
law—at least for core questions of substantive patent law such as the 
patentability requirements in the Patent Act. Instead, Professor 
Golden argues that such lack of deference may not be too important 
in light of the agency’s position as a prime mover in developing patent 
law.11 
Understanding their disagreement requires a deep dive into 
Mead’s muddy waters. The inquiry from United States v. Mead12 
remains the Supreme Court’s governing standard for determining 
whether Congress intended for an agency’s statutory interpretation to 
carry the force of law such that it becomes eligible for Chevron 
deference.13 As many administrative law scholars have noted over the 
 
 7. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in 
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).  
 9. David Kappos, Re-Inventing the US Patent System, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: A BLOG 
FROM USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/re_inventing_the_us_patent [https://perma.cc/3KCT-
SSEV].  
 10. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1597.  
 11. Golden, supra note 4, at 1658. 
 12. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 13. Id. at 227–30. 
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years, the Mead standard is hopelessly confusing.14 To be sure, in City 
of Arlington v. FCC,15 the Court clarified that Chevron deference 
applies whenever “Congress has unambiguously vested the [agency] 
with general authority to administer the [statute] through rulemaking 
and adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue [is] 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”16 But uncertainty 
persists when Congress has not granted general rulemaking or formal 
adjudicative authority. As the Mead opinion itself noted, the Supreme 
Court has “sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even 
when no such administrative formality was required and none was 
afforded.”17 
Professors Benjamin, Golden, and Rai all agree that PTAB 
decisions fall into this uncertain category—even after the AIA 
granted the PTO rulemaking power to “prescribe regulations . . . 
establishing and governing” certain PTAB review proceedings as well 
as “the relationship of such review to other proceedings under [the 
Patent Act].”18 As Professor Golden contends, the AIA provides the 
PTO rulemaking authority over agency procedures, but generally not 
over substantive patent law.19 In other words, the AIA’s “provisions 
and broader context provide little reason to suspect that Congress 
snuck delegation of Chevron-level authority for the PTO through the 
back door of PTAB post-issuance proceedings.”20 Moreover, as 
Professor Golden argues, the PTAB adjudicatory processes fall short 
of formal adjudication (as that term is contemplated by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)) and seem more analogous to 
the type of agency rulings at issue in Mead, which the Court deemed 
ineligible for Chevron deference.21 
 
 14. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency 
Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 480 (2002); 
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 361 (2003); 
see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s new doctrine is neither 
sound in principle nor sustainable in practice.”). 
 15. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 16. Id. at 1874. 
 17. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231. 
 18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(4), 326(a)(4) (2012). 
 19. Golden, supra note 4, at 1672–76. 
 20. Id. at 1675–76. 
 21. See id. at 1678–81. Note that the Federal Circuit seems to believe that at least one 
PTAB proceeding—inter partes review—requires APA-level formal adjudication. See, e.g., Dell 
Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, No. 2015-1513, 2016 WL 1019075, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2016); 
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. 2014-1516, 2016 WL 520236, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 
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Professors Benjamin and Rai agree that PTAB review 
proceedings do not meet the APA’s definition of formal adjudication. 
They argue, however, that the review procedures nevertheless have 
sufficient rigor and formality to be eligible for Chevron deference, at 
least where the PTO Director has exercised her authority to 
“declar[e] an opinion precedential or conduct[] a rehearing or both.”22 
Professors Benjamin and Rai conclude that “[t]he tools . . . for 
Chevron deference, in other words, are in the Director’s hands.”23 
Both sides make reasonable arguments about whether PTAB 
interpretations of substantive patent law are eligible for Chevron 
deference. If pressed to take sides, Professors Benjamin and Rai seem 
to have the better argument under Mead and its progeny—especially 
in light of the sweeping authority the AIA grants to the PTAB. As 
another contributor to this Symposium has persuasively argued in a 
previous article, the AIA “rejects over two hundred years of court 
dominance in patent policy by anointing the PTO as the chief 
expositor of substantive patent law standards.”24 It is, however, a close 
question in an area of the law that is quite uncertain. Congressional 
action in the form of the AIA, coupled with the PTO Director’s 
ability to seek rehearing and declare a PTAB decision precedential, 
tip the scales—at least for me—in favor of Chevron deference 
applying under Mead and its progeny. 
II.  THE STRONGER CASE FOR SEEKING CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
This Essay does not endeavor to bring more clarity to this 
question, which is already well argued in the other contributions to 
this Symposium. Instead, it pushes back on another conclusion 
reached by Professors Benjamin and Rai, namely, that “the PTO’s 
failure to push for deference may reflect a calculation that the 
benefits of such a push will be fairly low, because of uncertainty about 
 
10, 2016); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015). That the PTAB 
may already have to adhere to the procedures required for APA-level formal adjudication may 
be an additional reason why the PTO should seek Chevron deference. Thanks to Melissa 
Wasserman for bringing this development to my attention.  
 22. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1590; see id. at 1578–90 (providing extended analysis 
of the legal question).  
 23. Id. at 1590. 
 24. Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the 
PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1965 (2013); see also id. at 1966 (“Applying administrative 
law principles to the AIA provides that the PTO’s legal interpretations of the Patent Act, as 
announced by its new adjudicatory proceedings, are entitled to the highly deferential standard 
of review articulated in Chevron . . . .”). 
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the Court actually deferring in situations in which it seems 
appropriate.”25 They base this argument in part on “the Supreme 
Court’s recent lack of interest (and the Federal Circuit’s longstanding 
lack of interest) in applying conventional administrative law 
principles in the patent context.”26 As further detailed below, 
Professors Benjamin and Rai could and should make a stronger case 
for the PTO to urge the Court to reject patent exceptionalism and 
apply Chevron deference to certain PTAB interpretations of 
substantive patent law. 
A. The Relationship Between the PTO and the DOJ 
Professors Benjamin and Rai mainly focus their analysis on 
whether the PTO Director will seek Chevron deference.27 That 
inquiry is too limited. The cost-benefit analysis about whether to seek 
Chevron deference is calculated not only by the agency head, but also 
by the agency’s litigators. For the PTO, those litigators include 
attorneys outside of the agency who work on the DOJ’s Civil 
Appellate Staff and in the Solicitor General’s Office. Importantly, 
these DOJ attorneys are administrative law generalists who represent 
diverse federal agencies and defend agency statutory interpretations 
in a variety of contexts. Unlike officials at agencies that may have 
long suffered from administrative law exceptionalism, the DOJ 
attorneys should be much more receptive to an argument that patent 
law is not exceptional and that general administrative law principles 
apply. Indeed, as I have explored elsewhere (and experienced 
firsthand working on the DOJ’s Civil Appellate Staff), the DOJ 
litigators have a “playbook for developing and defending [agency] 
statutory interpretations.”28 And that playbook tends to be based on 
general principles of administrative law that apply irrespective of the 
particular regulatory context.  
 
 25. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1599. 
 26. Id. at 1597. 
 27. To be fair, Professors Benjamin and Rai recognize the interaction between the PTO 
and its DOJ lawyers. See, e.g., id. at 1597 (noting that “the agency and its lawyers (both at the 
PTO and the DOJ)” must consider courts’ “recent lack of interest” in applying administrative 
law principles to patent law).  
 28. Christopher J. Walker, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 
73, 77 (2013). 
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This is not just a theory. Take, for instance, Cuozzo Speed 
Technologies, LLC v. Lee29—a case the Supreme Court will decide 
later this Term.30 One of the questions presented in Cuozzo is 
“[w]hether the PTO acted within its rulemaking authority in 
promulgating 37 C.F.R. 42.100(b), which . . . provides that patent 
claims shall be given their ‘broadest reasonable construction’ during 
inter partes review proceedings.”31 In upholding the regulation, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found it appropriate to 
apply Chevron deference: “Because Congress authorized the PTO to 
prescribe regulations, the validity of the regulation is analyzed 
according to the familiar Chevron framework.”32 
In its briefing before the Supreme Court, the PTO—through its 
DOJ lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office and on the Civil 
Appellate Staff—advanced a generalist administrative law position to 
defend the PTO’s regulation. It argued, first and foremost, that under 
the AIA “Congress has granted the PTO broad authority to 
‘prescribe regulations . . . establishing and governing inter partes 
review.’”33 The PTO then made a Chevron-eligible argument relying 
on Mead: 
Pursuant to [the America Invents Act’s] grant of rulemaking power, 
and following notice and comment, the PTO promulgated a 
regulation . . . . Such a regulation is “binding in the courts unless 
procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 227 (2001). The PTO acted well within its discretion in 
adopting [that regulation].34 
 
 29. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at I, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 
793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446) 
[hereinafter Fed. Gov’t Br. in Opp.]. 
 32. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279. The Federal Circuit made clear that it did “not draw that 
conclusion from any finding that Congress has newly granted the PTO power to interpret 
substantive statutory ‘patentability’ standards.” Id.; see id. at 1290 (Newman, C.J., dissenting) 
(analyzing the text of the AIA and “discern[ing] no authorization to the PTO to change the law 
of how claims of issued patents are construed”). 
 33. Fed. Gov’t Br. in Opp., supra note 31, at 9 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2012)).  
 34. Id.; accord Brief for the Respondent at 34, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 
F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446) 
[hereinafter Fed. Gov’t Merits Br.]. 
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Indeed, the PTO expressly rejected the argument that was raised by 
the petitioner and arguably supported by Federal Circuit precedent, 
that is, that the PTO’s rulemaking authority does not extend to 
substantive patent law.35 “Within the four corners of the AIA itself,” 
the PTO argued, the “petitioner identifies no indication that the 
PTO’s rulemaking authority is limited to procedural matters.”36 
The importance of Cuozzo should not be overstated. Even if the 
Supreme Court agrees that Chevron deference applies to the PTO’s 
regulation, that does not necessarily mean that PTAB adjudicatory 
decisions are similarly eligible for Chevron deference. (If the PTO is 
found to have substantive interpretive authority under the AIA, 
however, that certainly bolsters Professors Benjamin and Rai’s 
argument.) Nor would such a victory necessarily mean that the PTO 
has broad, substantive interpretive authority that would extend to 
core questions of patent law, such as the requirements for 
patentability.37 Instead, Cuozzo is offered as an example of the 
dangers of focusing myopically on the PTO Director as the 
decisionmaker. 
As discussed in Part II.B, the PTO and its DOJ litigators have 
not yet aggressively pushed for the end of patent exceptionalism. But 
especially in light of the enactment of the AIA, the creation of the 
PTAB, and the PTO’s briefing in Cuozzo, the time seems ripe for 
such a move. 
B. Chevron’s Weakening of the Federal Circuit 
Professors Benjamin and Rai argue that the Supreme Court is 
unlikely to embrace calls to abandon patent exceptionalism because, 
“Zurko . . . notwithstanding, recent Supreme Court opinions in the 
patent arena have tended to reject standard administrative law 
principles. These opinions have instead given precedence to a forceful 
 
 35. Fed. Gov’t Merits Br., supra note 34, at 34–37; accord Fed. Gov’t Br. in Opp., supra 
note 31, at 15 (arguing that “nothing in the AIA’s delegation of rulemaking authority limits the 
agency to ‘procedural’ rules” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4))).  
 36. Fed. Gov’t Merits Br., supra note 34, at 37.  
 37. In particular, the PTO later suggests that the AIA may not have granted the PTO the 
authority “to issue legislative rules governing the basic conditions for patentability,” id. at 39, 
and that, in all events, the regulation at issue—the PTO’s embrace of the broadest-reasonable-
construction approach—is procedural, not substantive, under Federal Circuit precedent. Id. at 
39–41. In other words, the substantive–procedural debate in Cuozzo is much narrower than the 
question of whether the PTO has broad interpretive authority over core substantive questions 
of patent law, such as patent-eligibility, novelty, and nonobviousness. 
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reading of the Court’s own pre-APA cases.”38 It is true that in at least 
one recent case, Kappos v. Hyatt,39 the Court seemed to reject the 
PTO’s call to apply general administrative law principles.40 But in 
most cases to date, the PTO has not aggressively argued against the 
Federal Circuit’s longstanding position of patent exceptionalism. Nor 
has the PTO asked the Court to weigh in on whether courts or the 
agency should be the authoritative interpreter of substantive patent 
law. Things would change if the PTO actually requested Chevron 
deference. 
One reason for optimism is the Supreme Court’s growing 
discontent with the patent law precedent created by the Federal 
Circuit, which is the federal court of appeals with exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent-related disputes.41 For example, in the last 
five years, the Court has reviewed twenty-four cases from the Federal 
Circuit, and it has reversed two-thirds of the time.42 With respect to 
October Term 2013, in which the Court considered six patent cases, 
“the Court unanimously reversed in the first five (a remarkable 0-for-
45 record for the Federal Circuit in terms of persuading Supreme 
Court justices), and in a sixth and final case the Court upheld a 
 
 38. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1591. In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s tax exceptionalist view and held that the APA’s “standards governing judicial 
review of findings of fact made by federal administrative agencies” should apply “when the 
Federal Circuit reviews findings of fact made by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).” 
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).  
 39. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012). 
 40. Id. at 1696 (“We reject the Director’s contention that background principles of 
administrative law govern the admissibility of new evidence and require a deferential standard 
of review in a § 145 proceeding.”). It is important to note that the PTO Director conceded that 
the administrative-record rule established by the APA did not apply because the Patent Act 
allows for the introduction of new evidence. See id. And the Court limited its holding to those 
circumstances where the general APA provisions do not apply: “In light of these aspects of 
§ 145 proceedings—at least in those cases in which new evidence is presented to the district 
court on a disputed question of fact—we are not persuaded by the Director’s suggestion that 
§ 145 proceedings are governed by the deferential principles of agency review.” Id. at 1697. 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents or 
plant variety protection”); id. § 1295(a)(4) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over decisions from, inter alia, the PTAB and the PTO Director). 
 42. These numbers are from October Term 2010 through October Term 2014, as collected 
by SCOTUSblog. See Stat Pack Archive, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack [https://perma.cc/PU8U-5DG8]. To be sure, a 
two-thirds reversal rate is not atypical among circuits. See, e.g., SCOTUSblog Stat Pack, Oct. 
Term 2014, SCOTUSBLOG 3 (June 30, 2015), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/SB_scorecard_OT14.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH95-2GKT] (noting an 
overall 72% reversal rate).  
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splintered en banc Federal Circuit decision but took exception to 
much of the doctrine that had produced the ruling.”43 As one 
commentator noted earlier this year, “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has 
tried for 10 years to rein in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit and its strongly pro-patent interpretations of the law, yet the 
tug-of-war does not appear to be letting up.”44 
In such an environment, the Supreme Court may be more willing 
to embrace Chevron deference as a means of weakening the Federal 
Circuit. After all, as Melissa Wasserman has argued, “the PTO has a 
comparative institutional advantage over the Federal Circuit and . . . 
the Federal Circuit does not emerge as a clear winner with respect to 
the comparative risk of interest group influence.”45 By declaring the 
agency the authoritative interpreter of patent law, which is what 
Chevron deference entails,46 the Supreme Court would be shifting 
power away from the Federal Circuit at a time when the Court seems 
frustrated with the Federal Circuit’s substantive approach to patent 
law. This shift has the additional value of “usher[ing] the patent 
system into the modern administrative era, which has long recognized 
the deficiencies associated with judge-driven policy.”47 
 
 43. Jeff Bleich & Josh Patashnik, The Federal Circuit Under Fire, SUPREME COURT 
WATCH, Fall 2014, at 40, 
http://www.mto.com/Templates/media/files/Reprints/Josh%20Patashnik/
Bleich%20%20Patashnik%20--%20Supreme%20Court%20Watch%20Fall%202014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RR84-FN6Z]; accord Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 2 LANDSLIDE, Jan.-Feb. 2010, at 2, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan2010_
Hofer.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8KZ-QCWW] (“Though the sample size of patent-
related cases reviewed and decided by the Supreme Court is small, the trend is clear. The 
Supreme Court is actively seeking to assert its views in patent law rather than letting the Federal 
Circuit determine the fate of patent law on its own.”). 
 44. Steven Seidenberg, Patent Tension: The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court 
Continue Their Tug-of-War over Interpretations of Patent Law, ABA J. (Jan. 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tug_of_war_over_interpretations_of_patent_law_c
ontinues_between_federal [https://perma.cc/UFB6-6LW3]. Patent law scholarship has 
documented this trend. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 
1076–83 (2014); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Lecture, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from 
the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010); Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 63–64 
(2013). 
 45. Wasserman, supra note 24, at 1967; see id. at 2007–18 (exploring in greater detail this 
normative case for Chevron deference to PTO legal interpretations). 
 46. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 
(2005) (noting that when Chevron applies, the agency—not the reviewing court—is “the 
authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason) of such statutes”). 
 47. Wasserman, supra note 24, at 1966. 
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C. Chevron’s Displacement of the Era of Stare Decisis 
A core reason why Professors Benjamin and Rai believe that it is 
not expedient to ask the Supreme Court for Chevron deference to 
PTAB legal interpretations centers on “the Supreme Court’s 
apparent decision to deprioritize administrative law in favor of the 
stare decisis effect of Court cases that predate the rise of the modern 
administrative state.”48 To borrow from the title of their article, they 
argue that we live in “an era of patent stare decisis,” where judicial 
precedent trumps agency statutory interpretation.49 This explanation, 
however, underestimates the Supreme Court’s breathtaking extension 
of Chevron deference to trump judicial precedent in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.50 
In Brand X, the Court reaffirmed the Chevron doctrine: “If a 
statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is 
reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s 
construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from 
what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”51 The 
Court then took that principle one step further. The Ninth Circuit 
below had refused to afford Chevron deference because it had 
already construed the same statutory provision in a conflicting 
manner. It thus held that its precedent foreclosed the agency’s 
interpretation.52 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “[o]nly 
a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses 
the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the 
agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”53 Once a 
court has identified an ambiguity, there is a “presumption” that 
Congress “desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess 
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”54 
 
 48. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1565. 
 49. Id. at 1563. 
 50. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83; cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1594 (noting that, if 
Brand X were to apply here, “administrative interpretations of the patent statute could trump 
prior judicial interpretations unless those prior judicial determinations held that the 
interpretation in question was the only permissible one”). 
 51. Id. at 980 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843–44, 834 n.11 (1984)). 
 52. Id. at 982. 
 53. Id. at 982–83. 
 54. Id. at 982 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)). See 
generally Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative 
Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 
139, 183–89 (2012) (exploring the application of Brand X in a variety of regulatory contexts). 
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To the extent Brand X could have been viewed as an outlier, one 
need look no further than the Court’s subsequent decision in Negusie 
v. Holder.55 There, the agency had interpreted a provision of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act to require the denial of asylum to 
any otherwise qualifying noncitizen if he had persecuted others in his 
native country, even if his participation in persecution was not 
voluntary.56 The Court concluded that Chevron deference did not 
apply because the agency had erroneously believed that it was bound 
by prior Supreme Court precedent and thus had not exercised its 
Chevron discretion to provide an alternative interpretation. The 
Court, however, did not provide its own interpretation either. It 
instead remanded the question to the agency, concluding that, when 
“the [agency] has not yet exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret 
the statute in question, the proper course, except in rare 
circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation 
or explanation.”57 The Court grounded its remand decision in Brand 
X: “This remand rule exists, in part, because ‘ambiguities in statutes 
within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of 
authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable 
fashion.’”58 
It is worth noting that Negusie also illustrates the limitations of 
Professor Golden’s PTO-as-prime-mover argument.59 There are no 
doubt many unanswered questions of substantive patent law where 
the PTO can move first, but the PTO nevertheless operates in an era 
of patent stare decisis that limits many potential moves. Indeed, as 
Professor Golden has argued elsewhere, the agency’s “visible 
struggles to make sense of the court’s rulings [on subject-matter 
eligibility] have strengthened my sense that, at least absent 
congressional action to clarify subject-matter eligibility directly, the 
[PTO] will have trouble improving the situation as long as it has only 
‘interpretive authority bound to preexisting judicial precedent.’”60 If 
 
 55. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). 
 56. Id. at 514 (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012)). 
 57. Id. at 523. 
 58. Id. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
980 (2005)). See generally Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial 
Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1561–79 (2015) (exploring the 
evolution of the ordinary remand rule).  
 59. Golden, supra note 6, at 1689–95. 
 60. John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for 
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1775 
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Chevron deference were to apply, Brand X and Negusie would 
remove any such limitations. 
When Brand X and Negusie are read together, it is easier to 
appreciate the PTO’s powerful argument in favor of reversing the 
prior era of patent stare decisis. To date, the PTO has not invoked 
Brand X to trump Supreme Court or Federal Circuit precedent on 
substantive patent law. But from its experience in Negusie and Brand 
X, the DOJ is no doubt well aware of the power of Brand X to trump 
any stare decisis effect of prior judicial precedent. So perhaps it is 
only a matter of time. 
D. Chevron’s Power to Reorient the Agency–Court Relationship and 
Rein in Lower Courts 
Professors Benjamin and Rai also question the potential benefits 
of Chevron deference, in that it may not make a difference in whether 
a court upholds an agency’s interpretation.61 To support this 
conclusion they cite the empirical work of Bill Eskridge and Lauren 
Baer, which “suggests that the Supreme Court often fails to apply 
Chevron in many areas of substantive law” and “that at the Supreme 
Court win rates under Chevron are lower than win rates under 
seemingly less deferential regimes.”62 The Eskridge and Baer study, 
however, did not focus on the effect of Chevron deference on 
displacing prior judicial precedent; indeed, it predated Negusie. The 
Brand X version of Chevron deference, as discussed in Part II.C, 
would force the Supreme Court to reconsider its prior precedent 
interpreting substantive patent law—at least where the Patent Act is 
found to be ambiguous.63 
Moreover, for purposes of evaluating the benefits of Chevron 
deference for PTAB interpretations, the more important court is not 
the Supreme Court, but the Federal Circuit, which, as noted in Part 
 
(2014) (quoting John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 1041, 1110–11 (2011)). 
 61. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1597–98. 
 62. Id. (citing William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1125, 1142–43 (2008)). 
 63. The PTO should exercise caution, however, in reading too much into pre-Chevron 
judicial declarations of statutory ambiguity. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 
LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842–44 (2012) (reaffirming the Brand X principle but rejecting the 
agency’s argument that a 1958 Supreme Court opinion stating that a statute is ambiguous 
creates space for subsequent agency interpretation when the statute is in fact unambiguous). 
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II.B, has exclusive jurisdiction over patent-related appeals. At the 
lower-court level, the effect of Chevron deference would be greater. 
After all, the Supreme Court reviews only a fraction of Federal 
Circuit opinions. The Court might well be less likely to review a 
Federal Circuit opinion that merely affirms the agency’s statutory 
interpretation as reasonable under Chevron. Conversely, a Federal 
Circuit decision refusing to defer to the agency’s interpretation would 
arguably be an even more attractive candidate for Supreme Court 
review; not only did the Federal Circuit potentially get substantive 
patent law wrong, but it also overturned an agency’s authoritative 
interpretation of that law. 
Indeed, if the Eskridge and Baer findings about the Supreme 
Court’s inconsistent application of Chevron deference hold true 
today, a declaration that Chevron applies to the PTO’s interpretation 
of substantive patent law would rein in the Federal Circuit without 
limiting the Supreme Court’s subsequent review. Accordingly, the 
impact of a Supreme Court declaration that the PTO—not the 
Federal Circuit—is the authoritative interpreter of substantive patent 
law should not be undervalued.64 
CONCLUSION 
Professors Benjamin and Rai have made a strong case for the 
Supreme Court to abandon patent exceptionalism and apply Chevron 
deference to certain PTAB interpretations of substantive patent law. 
But they stop short of making the case for the PTO to request such 
deference. Instead, they conclude that “the PTO’s failure to push for 
deference may reflect a calculation that the benefits of such a push 
will be fairly low.”65 To the contrary, the PTO—with the help of its 
DOJ litigators—has potent legal arguments to overturn an era of 
 
 64. Professors Benjamin and Rai also theorize that “[i]t could be that agencies are much 
more aggressive when they know that Chevron deference will apply, so the lower rate in 
Chevron cases simply reflects agencies’ greater aggressiveness in statutory interpretation.” 
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1598. My empirical work seems to support this intuition. See 
Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 721–25, 722 fig.3 (2014) (finding that the vast majority of agency rule 
drafters surveyed understand that their chances in court are better under Chevron than 
Skidmore and that two in five rule drafters surveyed agreed or strongly agreed—and another 
two in five somewhat agreed—that a federal agency is more aggressive in its interpretive efforts 
if it is confident Chevron deference applies); see also Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency 
Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1048–66 (2015) (exploring the study’s 
administrative law findings in greater detail). 
 65. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1599. 
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patent stare decisis and disempower the Federal Circuit as primary 
interpreter of substantive patent law. Perhaps the Court’s 
forthcoming decision in Cuozzo will spark this movement against 
patent exceptionalism. 
Administrative law exceptionalism, however, does not usually 
die on its own. Among the important lessons learned from tax law’s 
retreat from exceptionalism is that law professors can play a crucial 
role. As I have detailed elsewhere, in the case of tax exceptionalism, 
Kristin Hickman led a decade-long charge in both law reviews and 
amicus briefs by calling for, among other things, Chevron deference 
to apply to statutory interpretations promulgated by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS).66 Those efforts culminated in 2011, when the 
Supreme Court agreed that certain IRS statutory interpretations are 
eligible for Chevron deference.67 The D.C. Circuit and the Tax Court 
have since followed suit by rejecting administrative law 
exceptionalism in other areas of tax law.68 
Hopefully patent law scholars will follow Professor Hickman’s 
lead and make similar calls for the Supreme Court to reverse course 
in patent law. Professors Benjamin and Rai have established a solid 
substantive foundation for such advocacy. 
 
 
 66. See Christopher J. Walker, Taking Administrative Law to Tax Exceptionalism, 
JOTWELL (Aug. 12, 2014), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/taking-administrative-law-to-tax-
exceptionalism [https://perma.cc/D6KC-75D7]. 
 67. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–56 (2011). 
 68. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(holding that the judicial review provisions of the APA apply with full force to an IRS notice 
because “[t]he IRS is not special in this regard; no exception exists shielding it—unlike the rest 
of the Federal Government—from suit under the APA”); Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. No. 
3, 2015 WL 4522662, at *28 (T.C. July 27, 2015) (invalidating income tax regulations because 
they were not the product of “reasoned decisionmaking” as required by the APA and related 
administrative law precedent). 
